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Abstract: Hohwy et al.’s (2008) explanation of binocular rivalry is taken as a classic 
illustration of hierarchical predictive coding’s explanatory power. I revisit the account and 
show that it cannot explain the role of reward in binocular rivalry. I show that a modified 
version of the predictive processing approach may account for the role of reward by 
recasting it as a form of optimism bias. Accepting this account, however, is at odds with the 
epistemic commitments favored by proponents of hierarchical predictive coding. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The visual system must estimate the shapes and sizes of objects from retinal stimulation. However, 
the distribution of light on the retina is consistent with an indefinitely large combination of stimulus 
objects and patterns of object illumination. This is known as the inverse optics or underdetermination 
problem (Helmholtz, 1867). 
There are two general approaches to characterizing and explaining the underdetermination 
problem. The first is pragmatic in emphasis, characterizing perceptual systems as generating 
representations of distal stimuli for the purposes of action (for a review, see Jacob, 2015). That is, on 
this type of view, how an individual perceives an object is thought to depend in part on what she is 
going to do with it. For example, enactivist theories propose that perceptual experiences depend on 
dispositional motor responses (Noe, 2004), and efferent readiness theories propose that perceptual 
states prepare an observer to move and act in relation to her environment (Coren, 1986; Vishton et 
al. 2007).  On broadly pragmatic approaches to perception, our perceptual systems can misinform us 
about what is out there in the world, but still be thought to perform their function if they enable us 
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to act appropriately, as when an individual perceives the reconstructed shape of an otherwise 
occluded object.  
The second general approach to the underdetermination problem characterizes perception in 
much more robustly epistemic terms (for a discussion and review, see Siegel & Silins, 2015). On this 
type of view, perceptual systems produce veridical representations of distal stimuli principally for the 
purposes of knowledge; in many cases, perception is simply defined as “a way of acquiring 
information, beliefs, or knowledge about the world by means of the senses [...] ‘perceive’ and its 
derivatives ‘see’, ‘hear’, and the like, are usually taken to be success verbs” (Macpherson 2009, 502). 
On this type of view, then, how an individual perceives an object depends on what is really out there 
in the world, and whether and how her perceptual system’s is able to represent it accurately. 
Notably, these representations are analyzed independently of actions undertaken by the organism, 
and they are taken to be better and worse to the degree that they ‘get it right’ about the external 
world. Hence, if an individual claims to see an object in front her when in fact it isn’t there, her 
perceptual system is taken to have failed. 
Proponents of hierarchical predictive coding widely adopt an epistemic approach to 
perception, emphasizing the twin roles of knowledge and inference. For example, Clark (2013, p. 
182) describes perception as "probabilistic, knowledge-driven inference;” Hohwy (2013, p. 2) states 
that, "By testing hypotheses[,] we get the world right;" and Friston (2018, p. 1019) observes that 
perception  constructs explanations for “what’s going on out there.” Even on views according to 
which the main function of knowledge is to enable action, such as on the view put forward by Wiese 
and Metzinger (2017, p.3) the authors maintain that "one’s brain constantly forms statistical 
estimates, which function as representations of ‘what is currently out there in the world.’"1  
 
1 Clark (2015, Section 6.7) offers a nuanced consideration of the relationship between the inferential nature of 
perception and the role of perception in guiding action. Describing the tension between what he calls the ‘intellectualist’ 
and ‘non-reconstructive’ approaches to perception – where the latter denies that perception must involve rich internal 
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These epistemic considerations inform predictive coding's engagement with phenomena 
such as binocular rivalry. Binocular rivalry occurs when one stimulus is shown to one eye at the same 
time as a different stimulus is shown to the other. The resulting experience is of the two images 
alternating back and forth. For example, if one eye is shown an image of a face and the other eye is 
shown an image of a house, then, rather than seeing the face and the house superimposed over one 
another, the experience is of seeing a face, then a house, and so on. Since binocular rivalry is a case 
of perception clearly not representing 'what's going on out there,’ it constitutes an important test 
case for theories that aim to explain why we have particular perceptual states at particular times.  
To try and address this challenge, Jakob Hohwy and colleagues’ (2008) self-described 
‘epistemological’ explanation recasts the problem of binocular rivalry in terms of Bayesian inference. 
The authors propose to explain the phenomenon by providing a rigorously parsimonious 
explanation of why the two stimuli appear alternate in visual perception (p. 700). The approach is 
widely cited across the cognitive sciences as an illustration of predictive coding’s ubiquity in the 
brain, as well as its explanatory power as a general theory of the mind (e.g., see Clark (2013) for a 
prominent discussion; see also Metzinger & Wiese, 2017). 
In this paper, I argue that Hohwy et al.’s (2008) epistemological account fails to explain the 
role of reward in perceptual dominance, afeature of binocular rivalry. There are two types of 
perceptual dominance:  where one percept is seen first (dominance at onset), and where one is seen 
for a longer period of time (dominance over duration). The epistemological solution fails to explain 
 
models -  he argues that “’inference’, as it functions in the PP story, is not compelled to deliver internal states that bear 
richly reconstructive contents. It is not there to construct an inner realm able to stand in for the full richness of the 
external world. Instead, it may deliver efficient, low-cost strategies whose unfolding and success depend delicately and 
continuously upon the structure and ongoing contributions of the external realm itself, as exploited by various forms of 
action and intervention” (p. 191). Note, however, that Clark’s point here is still largely one about the relative richness or 
sparsity of a given representation, rather than discussion of its relative veracity relative to utility for guiding action. In 
other words, Clark acknowledges that perception needn’t reconstruct a comprehensive picture of the external world, but 
he does not deny that the job of perception remains, to whatever degree of detail, to tell us about the world. So, Clark is 
open to a non-reconstructive view of perception; but he remains committed to an epistemic account of perception. 
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to clarify this point.  
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both types of dominance and thus fails to provide a comprehensive explanation of the perceptual 
data.  
Next, I show that a modified version of the predictive coding approach can account for the 
role of reward in both types of perceptual dominance. However, this model no longer offers an 
epistemic picture of perception: instead, it characterizes perceptual experience in pragmatic terms, 
making perceptual inferences conditional on inferences about policies and, specifically, control 
states. Proponents of predictive coding thus cannot remain committed to the strictly epistemic 
picture of perception and at the same time explain the phenomenon of binocular rivalry. I consider 
the implications of this impasse for predictive coding accounts of perception, as well as for rival 
computational approaches to the mind, most notably, for reinforcement learning views. 
I begin by sketching the epistemological view and its proposed explanation of binocular 
rivalry.  
 
2. Hohwy et al.’s (2008) epistemological solution  
2.1 The general view 
Hierarchical predictive coding is one answer among many to the question of how perceptual systems 
solve the underdetermination problem.2 As its name suggests, the view proposes that perceptual 
systems actively make predictions about what their sensory input should be, rather than passively 
using inputs to draw inferences about the world, as had been previously thought. Perceptual systems 
compare these predictions with actual sensory input to calculate prediction errors, which reflect the 
difference between a given predicted and actual input. In a process known as prediction error 
minimization, the systems aim to minimize such prediction errors by continually revising their 
predictions in light of incoming sensory inputs.  
 
2 For an excellent review and discussion other approaches, see Rescorla (2015). 
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The view is hierarchical because it proposes that higher levels send predictions about the input 
to lower levels, and lower levels send bottom-up prediction errors which signal any discrepancies 
between the top-down predictions and actual input. This structure is thought to help explain how 
the brain is able to implement what are otherwise intractable inferences.  
The view is epistemological in the sense described above, that is, in that the perceptual systems 
are in the business of ‘getting it right’ about the external world. As Howhy et al. (2008, p. 688) 
observe, “The motivation behind this approach is the idea that binocular rivalry is an epistemic 
response to a seemingly incompatible stimulus condition where two distinct objects occupy the same 
spatiotemporal location.”  
The view is also epistemological in a second sense. The brain's inferences - based on 
predictions, prediction errors, and prediction error-minimization - are described in terms of Bayesian 
inference. That is, the view proposes that the brain updates its predictions by approximating Bayes 
rule, which specifies how we should update an existing probability in light of a new piece of 
evidence. Specifically, the rule dictates that we update probabilities according to Bayes theorem: 
    P(H|E) = P(E|H)P(H)/P(E)    (1) 
 
That is, our posterior probability for a given hypothesis—the probability of the hypothesis 
conditional on our evidence (P(H|E))—should be equal to the product of the probability of the 
evidence conditional on our hypothesis (P(E|H)) and the probability of the evidence, divided by the 
unconditional probability of the evidence.  Applied accordingly, the posterior probability P(H|E) 
replaces the prior probability P(H) until new evidence is introduced, and so on. The brain thus also 
applies a distinctly epistemic type of inference to solve the underdetermination problem.  
Perceptual inference is also determined by the precision or likelihood of the sensory data. 
Precision accounts for the uncertainty or noise associated with sensory experience (Hohwy 2013, p. 
59). For example, visual inputs are thought to be broadly reliable, but may be degraded underwater 
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or in the dark. Precision measures act as weightings on bottom-up precision errors in the 
aforementioned inferences.  
Finally, some defenders of predictive processing hold that action results from ‘active 
inferences’, which use the same framework of prediction error-minimization. In perceptual 
inference, prediction error-minimization results in updating percepts. By contrast, in active 
inference, prediction error-minimization is used to drive behavior. To illustrate the idea, take the 
idea of someone wanting a glass of water. On this framework, the mind predicts that it is reaching for 
a glass of water. Since this is initially not the case, this prediction results in substantial prediction 
error. The mind minimizes this error, not by updating its prediction, but by causing the arm to move 
toward the cup. Error is minimized via active inference when the prediction is realized (i.e. the 
person drinks). A central virtue of this approach is that the same framework aims to account for 
both perception and action, the resulting picture is of an organism or agent that alternates back and 
forth between perception and action.  
 
2.2 The problem  
Hohwy et al. (2008, p. 690) recast the problem of binocular rivalry in correspondingly 
epistemological terms. They propose that a successful view must explain three features of the 
phenomenon.3  
The first explanandum is called the individual vs. aggregate selection problemThe question is this: 
Why does a participant only see one of the two stimuli at a time, rather than seeing some 
combination of the two? For example, why does the participant perceive a house or a face, rather than 
 
3 Hohwy et al. divide the problem into two: a selection problem and an alternation problem. Since the selection problem 
itself consists of two components, however, and one of these components plays an important role in what follows, I 
have preserved their general analysis but split the classification into three.  
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a house superimposed over a face (a houseface)? In Bayesian terms, it raises the question of why the 
hypothesis face is selected over the conjunctive hypothesis house-face. 
The second explanandum is called the individual vs. individual selection problem. How does the 
perceptual decision select a given stimulus for perception? In other words, given that the participant 
only sees one stimulus, what procedure determines which one the participant sees first, e.g., a house 
rather than a face, or vice versa? In Bayesian terms, it asks why the hypothesis face is favored over 
the hypothesis house.  
Finally, the third explanandum is called the alternation problem. The alternation problem asks 
why perceptual experience alternates between the two stimuli rather than simply staying with one 
stimulus or the other. That is, if the participant first sees a house followed by a face, why do these 
two images continue to alternate? Again, in Bayesian terms, what it is about the nature of the 
hypothesis of either face or house, and of the process of revising such a hypothesis, that results in the 
phenomenon’s characteristic alternation? 
 
2.3 The solution 
The epistemological account explains the explananda as follows. Individual vs. aggregate selection occurs 
because face and house combined has a much lower prior than do either face or house: it is a priori 
improbable that what is being seen is really a house-face, and interactions with the environment that 
could have induced a prior for such a hypothesis are unlikely. Thus, as long as the low prior offsets 
the likelihood advantage for face and house over face or house, face and house will not be selected over 
either face or house.   
Second, individual vs. individual selection occurs because, assuming the contents of the stimuli 
are independent, face and house explain the evidence equally well, even though they each are unable to 
account for a large part of it – in other words, each explains the evidence equally poorly, and so they 
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are roughly equally likely. Given equal likelihood, the perceptual inference will tend to depend on the 
prior probability of the hypotheses. If, for some reason, say, face has a higher prior than does house, 
then face will be selected for perceptual dominance.  
Finally, alternation occurs because the hypothesis for either face or house only explains half of 
the stimuli. As a result, face, say, results in a strong prediction error signaling house, and so on. Since 
no single hypothesis combines a high prior and high likelihood, alternation between the two 
hypotheses results.   
 
3. A challenge for the view 
Hierarchical predictive coding has faced a number of objections. Some have criticized efforts to 
present predictive coding as a ‘grand unifying theory of the mind,’ (Anderson & Chemero, 2013; 
Ransom, Fazelpour, & Moll, 2017), notably on the grounds that it fails to account for the nature of 
motivation and desire (Huebner, 2012; Colombo & Wright, 2017, Klein 2018, Klein forthcoming). 
Others, in contrast, have offered more specific arguments that the predictive coding account fails to 
provide a satisfactory explanation of binocular rivalry in particular (Gershman, Vul, & Tenenbaum, 
2009; Gershman, Vul, & Tenenbaum, 2012; Rescorla, 2015). The challenge I present here extends 
both of these lines of reasoning. Specifically, I argue that since hierarchical predictive coding 
struggles to explain the nature of reward, the epistemological  solution to binocular rivalry will also 
struggle to account for the role of reward in perceptual dominance, both at onset and in duration 
The role of reward in binocular rivalry can be examined in three general paradigms 
conducted across a number of experiments (Balcetis, Dunning, & Granot, 2012; Wilbertz, van 
Slooten, & Sterzer, 2014; Marx & Einhauser, 2015; though see also Wilbertz, Kamenade, Schmack, 
& Sterzer, 2017 for less conclusive results). The first paradigm pertains to rewarded stimuli; the 
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second to rewarded percepts; and the third to punished percepts. All three of these can be taken as 
pertaining to individual vs. individual selection. Let’s look at each of these in turn. 
 
3.1 Rewarded stimuli  
The first paradigm involves three experiments using a rewarded stimulus and focused on onset 
dominance (Balcetis, Dunning, & Granot, 2012).  
In these experiments, participants were trained to associate letters and numbers with, say, 
positive or negative point values, respectively (these associations were varied randomly in the actual 
experiments). Participants were also taught to use glasses with a blue lens in one eye and a red lens 
in the other, such that the stimulus were in fact overlain over one another, but only allowing one eye 
to see one stimulus at a time, resulting in binocular rivalry, and to report what they saw (see Figure 
1).  
Over a series of trials, participants were then presented with numbers and letters 
simultaneously under binocular rivalry and asked to report which stimulus they perceived first. 
Based on their responses, they were awarded points using the aforementioned reward structure – 
say, positive points for letters and negative points for numbers – with their total positive point 
values earning them raffle tickets for a monetary prize.  
Broadly, the results of this study suggest that the stimulus associated with reward results in 
increased perceptual dominance of that stimulus. More specifically, they found that when letters 
were the rewarded stimulus, they were perceptually dominant at onset; when numbers were 
rewarded, they were perceptually dominant at onset; and, importantly, this effect only occurred 
when the participant himself or herself was rewarded. The effect disappeared when the reward 
points went to a disliked other (Table 1).  
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Notably, Balcetis et al. were careful to control for four confounds. It is useful to understand 
them in detail, since they isolate the role of reward in perceptual dominance.  First, the authors 
controlled for salience and exposure by using neutral, equally common stimuli, i.e., numbers and 
letters. Previous studies had used domestic animals and sea creatures, and it was plausible that the 
former may have been more familiar than the latter to most participants. They also controlled for 
implicit learning by asking participants to report the dominance percept at onset, i.e., to report 
which stimulus they saw first, and so limiting how much they could learn over the course of the 
perceptual experience.   
The authors controlled for response selection, i.e., motivated responding to maximize 
rewards, by adding a dot to each image that lay on the surface of one image but not the other. For 
example, in Figure 1, the dot is lying on the number 5 but not on the letter G. Participants were 
asked whether the dot was on or off the reported stimulus, and since there was no predetermined 
association between stimulus type and dot placement, participants could only correctly describe the 
location of the dot if accurately reported the percept which they actually saw. This feature of the 
experiment prevented participants from falsely reporting that they saw the rewarded stimulus first or 
for a longer duration.  
Finally, the authors also controlled for the possibility of task availability. This might have 
occurred as a result of either reading the instructions, and so priming the participants to perceive 
letters-or, conversely- because the task involved rewards, such that participants might be primed to 
perceive numbers. Although the random distribution of both types should have controlled for this, 
the experimenters also shifted the reward structure over the course of the experiment. In one block, 
rewards were to go to the participants; in another, rewards were to go to a disliked other. The 
principle behind this structure was that if task availability played a role in what stimulus was 
perceived, this effect should be present across both reward structures. By contrast, if it was reward 
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driving perceptual dominance, the effect should be seen in the first type of structure, rewarding the 
participant, but not in the second, reward the disliked other.   
And indeed, this latter result is in fact what the experimenters found. We thus have our first 
piece of evidence that reward plays a role in perceptual dominance. 
 
3.2 Rewarded percepts  
Despite the dot task controlling for response selectivity, the role that learning the associations 
between the letters, numbers, reward and costs plays remains open to an alternative interpretation, 
namely, that participants have had a chance to learn about the experiment’s reward structure, and so 
are responding in a way that maximizes their monetary reward, rather than faithfully reporting what 
they see. Consequently, the second paradigm aims to control for the role of learning by examining 
the role of rewarded percepts in perceptual dominance. That is, rather than introducing the 
participants to the reward structure in advance, this paradigm simply asks participants to report 
which percept they experience and introduces latent rather than explicit rewards.  
Developed by Wilbertz, van Slooten, & Sterzer (2014), in this experiment, participants were 
first presented with red and blue rotating grating stimuli rather than with numbers and letters (Figure 
2). As above, the experiment controlled for reporting bias by asking participants to indicate the 
location of a target stimulus (a black dot) located in one of four positions on the grating. Unlike in 
the first paradigm, however, the participants did not know anything about the reward structure in 
advance. Instead, they trained participants to report what they saw in binocular rivalry, and then 
gave them the following instructions: “From now on, you will sometimes hear the sound of a falling 
coin during one of the colors (red or blue) and this means that € 0.10 have been added to [...] your 
balance. Your task is still to respond to every target you see, just as before’” (2014, p. 3). Because it 
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would be impossible to measure perceptual dominance at onset in this structure, experimenters 
instead measured perceptual dominance over duration.  
The results support the role of reward in perceptual dominance. The authors found that the 
rewarded percept resulted in increased perceptual dominance over the duration of that percept (see 
Figure 3). Analogous results were reported by Marx and Einhauser (2015), who found that rewarded 
percepts resulted in increased perceptual dominance. Here, Marx and Einhauser described the 
effects of reward as qualitatively similar to the effects of attention on perceptual dominance (p. 8). 
3.3 Punished percepts  
In the previous paradigm, the rewarded percept resulted in the increased perceptual dominance over 
the duration of that percept. The third paradigm performs the same experiment, but rather than 
latently rewarding a given percept, the experimenter introduced small punishments. Specifically, the 
experimenters trained participants to report what they saw in binocular rivalry, and then gave them 
the following instructions: “From now on, you will sometimes hear the sound of a falling coin 
during one of the colors (red or blue) and this means that € 0.10 have been [...] subtracted from your 
balance. Your task is still to respond to every target you see, just as before’” (2014, p. 3).  
Notably, in this paradigm, the punished percept resulted in the perceptual dominance of the non-
punished percept (see Figure 3). As above, similar effects were also observed by Marx and Einhauser 
(2015), who reported that “non-punishing showed similar effects as reward, suggesting that the 
observed effects are specific to positive value and not a mere consequence of general stimulus 
relevance” (pp 8-9).  
 
3.4 Precision: a possible explanation? 
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Hierarchical predictive coding will prima facie struggle to accommodate the role of reward in 
binocular rivalry, because the framework strictly reduces perception to prediction error 
minimization, and so implicitly denies that reward plays any discrete or useful explanatory role.  
However, proponents of the framework could potentially argue that reward is reducible to 
precision and try to accommodate the foregoing results that way. Since this possibility is not explicitly 
discussed in the literature, I briefly sketch this potential line of argument here.4 However, I then 
show why even such a potential response will fail to provide a convincing explanation of reward in 
binocular rivalry.  
Various predictive coding accounts of reward can be reconstructed as follows (; Friston, 
Samothrakis, & Montague, 2012; Hohwy, 2013;; Clark, 2015, 2019; see also Feldman & Friston, 
2010 for a discussion of the relation between precision and attention):5  
1. Rewarded states are expected states; 
2. High reward states are then  expected with high precision; 
3. Therefore, reward can be explained by precision. 
If reward could be explained by precision, then hierarchical predictive coding could explain 
phenomena involving reward without positing any additional theoretical machinery, including the 
role of reward in binocular rivalry. 
However, premise 1 is problematic. As Klein (2018, forthcoming) has pointed out, there is little 
reason to think that an organism should expect rewarded states. After all, the world can be a fairly 
terrible place: we should expect the environment to present us rewards and punishments alike, and 
 
4 Thanks to Friston (personal correspondence, February 2018), Schwartenbeck (personal correspondence, February-
March 2018), and Hohwy (personal correspondence, February 2019) for helpful discussions of this possibility.  
5 This specific reconstruction is indebted to Hohwy (personal correspondence, February 2019): It it [sic] common to 
consider ‘reward’ as the absence of prediction error, under active inference. This means that rewarding states are 
expected states. This makes for an easy transition from predictive processing type views to views that include reward. 
High reward states are then expected with high precision.” 
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our survival depends as much on anticipating the latter as it does on anticipating the former. 
Moreover, as Gershman and Daw (2012, p. 10) point out, expectation and value come apart in cases 
where rare circumstances are unusually good or bad. For example, if a wolf eats a deer, not because 
it is rewarding but because this is what its evolutionary history leads it to expect it will do, then it 
should only continue to eat the same amount, even in the face of a substantial caloric windfall.6  
Proponents of predictive coding present two responses to this objection. The first response 
appeals to what are sometimes called deep expectations (Friston, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Seth, 2014). Clark 
(2019, pp. 5-6) characterizes deep expectations as follows:  
Predictions are made on the basis of a generative model, and the generative model that we 
(considered as whole embodied organisms) instantiate will have been shaped by both 
evolution and lifetime learning so as to be one that ensures we are deeply disposed to 
predict, with high action-entraining precision, the kinds of sensory state that help to keep us 
alive and viable. Among such deep-set predictions we will find, for example, ones that 
mandate keeping key features of the bodily plant within tolerable limits. 
On this view, organisms have evolved in such a way that they expect to find themselves in 
homeostatic equilibrium. When these expectations are violated, they adjust via active inference to 
return to it.  
One problem with the deep expectations view is that it is very difficult to make these 
expectations more precise; the resulting predictions are either empirically inadequate or 
computationally intractable (Klein, 2018). Another problem is that, as explanations go, it simply 
kicks the explanatory can down the road. Presumably, these organisms’ ancestors must have learned 
what kinds of things to expect; but how did they do so if, they too, were guided exclusively by 
prediction error minimization? Appealing to deep expectations thus fails to provide a substantive 
answer to the question of how such expectations of reward could have come about. Clark 
acknowledges this point, noting (2019, p. 6),  
 
6 See also Ransom et al. (2017) on this issue. 
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But, of course, such deep-set predictions get us only so far. At some point, the PP- theorist 
needs to accommodate the ordinary shifting webs of (as we would ordinarily say) desire—
the ebbs and flows of intention that sometimes lead us to play the piano, then to work on a 
paper, then to order a Chinese rather than Indian takeaway, watch a certain movie, and so 
on. 
Enter the second response to the objection. The second response appeals to what Clark more 
technically calls “shifting webs of precision assignments” which, together with multiple time-scales 
of precision, combine to produce the ins and outs of motivated behavior (2019, p. 6).  
These webs reverse the traditional direction of causation in motivation. On a traditional 
approach, for an organism to desire p is for that organism to be disposed to act so as to bring about 
p, i.e., to be disposed towards p (e.g., see Smith, 1994). By contrast, webs of precision produce a 
certain disposition or action, i.e., an agent is disposed from the webs of precision. They are drivers of 
action from behind, as it were. For example, Clark (2019, p. 6) explains, “As both our inner states 
(hunger, thirst, etc.) and outer contexts ebb and flow, some predictions enjoy increased precision, 
becoming positioned to drive immediate actions, while others remain in the background, awaiting 
the right opportunity to arise.” Or again, he writes,  
Right now, for example, it is my high-precision prediction that I am exploring Klein’s 
argument that is selecting my actions—both at the level of looking up various papers to 
check my claims, and then making specific key-strokes (cashing out precise proprioceptive 
predictions) on my computer (2019, p. 6). 
 
The problem with this explanation, of course, is that it can only describe motivated behavior in 
hindsight. As Clark himself recognizes (2019, p. 6), the skeptic will inevitably ask “why a given agent 
predicts the very things she does, with their various weightings. Perhaps she chooses to order tofu 
rather than chicken for the take-away. Why did her lifetime learning position the tofu prediction so 
as to trump her colleague’s suggestion of chicken?” He concludes that “The PP-mechanism itself 
offers no concrete story here.” 
This is deeply dissatisfying. It leaves us with little reason to think of rewarded states as 
expected states, other than perhaps by stipulation. But if we reject the first premise of the 
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reconstruction regarding reward and precision, then we ought to reject the general analysis of reward 
as precision.  
Where does this leave us with respect to an epistemological explanation of the role of reward 
in binocular rivalry? As noted at the outset of this section, the epistemological approach prima facie 
struggles to accommodate the role of reward in binocular rivalry because it reduces perception to 
prediction error minimization, and so does not appear to have the theoretical resources to explain 
the foregoing experimental results.7  
Taking it one step further, namely, to try and anticipate what the proponent of the 
epistemological explanation might say, I then sketched a potential line of argument based on the 
reduction of reward to precision. However, multiple version of this line of argument were found 
lacking. And if this is true, I content, then we ought to reject even this potential response from 
epistemological hierarchical predictive coding to explain the role of reward in binocular rivalry.  
 
4. A modified approach  
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then even a potential response from the epistemological version 
of the hierarchical predictive coding framework  struggles to provide a satisfactory account of the 
phenomenon of reward, and so struggles to explain the specific effect of reward on perceptual 
dominance in binocular rivalry. By extension, and contra Hohwy et al. (2008), it follows, I argue, that 
the hierarchical predictive coding account cannot explain  oneaspect of binocular rivalry, and so fails 
as a comprehensive  explanation of the phenomenon.  
 
7 Another way to put the same idea is that, prima facie, the epistemological approach does not predict that reward will play 
a role in binocular rivalry. By contrast, an alternative theory, such as a reward-based theory of visual fixation and 
attention, does predict such a role (Hayhoe and Ballard 2005).  
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Nonetheless, the challenge that emerges from the role of reward in binocular rivalry does 
not mean that all is lost for the proponents of predictive processing in general. On the contrary, 
those seeking to defend PP have a different theoretical version of the view available to them if they 
want to account for reward. That is, they can deploy a modified version of Bayesian model 
averaging.8  
In this section, I will show that this modified version may be able to account for the role of 
reward in binocular rivalry by recasting it as a special form of optimism bias.9 Notably, my aim is not 
to defend this approach, but rather to show that, independently of whether it can account for the 
role of reward, it is fundamentally at odds with the favored, strictly epistemic picture of perception 
committed to by most proponents of predictive coding, as outlined at the outset of the paper.  
 
4.1 Integrating perception and action  
On the hierarchical predictive coding view, an organism alternates between perceptual and active 
inference (Hohwy 2013, p. 91). 10 That is, the organism makes inferences about perception and 
action using the same Bayesian principles. Nonetheless, the organism calculates these inferences 
independently of one another.On the modified Bayesian averaging approach, by contrast, an 
organism’s inferences about perception and action are integrated in a way that may help explain the 
role of reward in binocular rivalry (Friston, Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Moutoussis, Behrens, & 
 
8 Thanks to [xxxx] and [xxxx] for helpful discussions of this issue. Thanks also to an anonymous reviewer for 
encouraging me to see the two versions as part of a single, overarching framework.  
9 The authors of the modified approach called it a “Variational Bayes Approach.” This sometimes causes confusion, as 
variational methods are separable from active inference. I thus use the more minimal “modified approach.”  
10 Specifically, Hohwy writes of the system, “We should therefore aim to alternate between perceptual and active 
inference. This alternation of inferential activity seems to me a very fundamental element of who we are and what we do. 
Getting the weighting of these inferential processes right is crucial to us: if the bound on surprise is not minimized 
enough by perceptual inference, then action suffers. If we persist with minimizing the bound for too long before we act, 
then we become inactive and end up spending too much time in states that are too surprising in the long run. If we 
persist with active inference for too long without pausing to revisit perceptual inference, then inaccuracy mounts and 
action becomes inefficient. If we react too soon to mounting prediction error during active inference then we get lost in 
overly complex and detailed models of the world” (2013, 91).  
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Dolan, 2013; Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2016; see also Friston, 
FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2017). Let’s look at the modified version in more 
detail before seeing how this version of the explanation might work.  
The central feature of the Bayesian averaging version of the approach is that it recasts 
traditional questions about goal-directed behavior, decision-making, and agency in terms of prior 
beliefs about what it would be best to do. More specifically, it recasts beliefs about external actions 
into beliefs about internal policies.11 Notably, much like perceptual states, these policies are inferred. 
Several further features follow from this. First, because policies are inferred, they are 
themselves associated with precision or confidence. Here, precision or confidence refers to the 
obtainability of a goal under a given policy (Friston et al. 2013, p. 11). For example, if the policy of 
drinking a cup of coffee is conducive to the goal of attaining alertness, then that policy is associated 
with a high measure of precision or confidence. Conversely, if the policy of drinking a cup of coffee 
is at odds with the goal of getting to sleep, then that policy is associated with a low measure of 
precision or confidence.  
Second, Friston et al. (2013, p. 2) argue that “because policy optimization is absorbed into 
the more general problem of inferring hidden states of the world, [i.e., perceptual states,] inferences 
about policies depend upon inferences about hidden states and vice versa.” That is, we can expect an 
organism’s inferences about what it will perceive to depend on what it will do or, more specifically in 
this case, to depend on its inferences about what it will do, and vice versa. Hence, on the modified 
approach, its inferences about perception and ‘action’ are fundamentally integrated in a way that was 
not true on the hierarchical predictive coding view.  
 
11 Another way of describing the transformation is from action states to control states; I stick to policies for the sake of 
consistency. 
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Following from the foregoing two features, third, inferences about perceptual states are 
informed not only by inferences about policies, but also by the precision or confidence measures 
associated with those policies. That is, an organism may make an inference about what it is likely to 
be seeing based not only on inferences about what it is doing, but also based on how likely it is that 
what it is doing will enable it to achieve its goal. For instance, a brushtail possum may infer that it is 
likely to be perceiving a eucalyptus leaf based not only on its inference that it is climbing a tree, but 
also based on a relatively high precision measure associated with that strategy of climbing a tree, 
which is likely to help it reach food. Conversely, it may infer that it is not likely to be perceiving a 
eucalyptus leaf based not only on its inference that it is clambering around the base of a tree rather 
than climbing it, but also on the relatively low precision measure associated with clambering as a 
means of reaching food. This means that the framework incorporates a bias between what one infers 
it would be good to do - a policy associated with high precision - and what one infers about what 
one is actually perceiving. Since the possum’s policy of climbing is associated with a high measure of 
precision, the critter also becomes more likely to perceive the very thing that it wants to see, namely, 
the eucalyptus leaf. The authors describe this bias as a kind of “optimism bias” (Sharot, Guitart-
Masip, Korn, Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012).  
How much more likely is the possum to see the leaf? In other words, how strongly optimistic 
is the bias on this view? The authors only specify the issue by saying that the status quo is roughly 
‘optimal.’ They characterize the concern in terms of precision, observing (Friston et al., 2013, pp. 10-
11):  
One of the key insights, afforded by the [modified view], is that precision has to be 
optimized. So what would happen if (estimated) precision was too high or too low? If 
precision was zero, then perception would be unbiased and represent a veridical 
representation of worldly states. However, there would be a failure of action selection in the 
sense that the value of all choices would be the same. One might plausibly associate this with 
the pathophysiology of Parkinson’s disease—that involves a loss of dopaminergic cells and a 
poverty of action selection. Conversely, if precision was too high, precise choices are made 
but there would be a predisposition to false perceptual inference—through the augmentation 
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of optimism bias. This might be a metaphor for the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, 
putatively associated with hyper-dopaminergic states (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). In short, 
there is an optimal precision for any context and the expected precision has to be evaluated 
carefully on the basis of current beliefs about the state of the world. 
 
Hence, on this version of the framework, degree of bias is context sensitive and, in healthy 
organisms, optimizes a trade-off between action selection and veridical perception – but without 
systematically misrepresenting the world in overly optimistic terms. 
 
4.2 The modified explanation of the role of reward in binocular rivalry 
With these assumptions in place, the modified version of the view can explain the role of reward in 
perceptual dominance in binocular rivalry. Specifically, on this version, the role of reward can be 
understood as a specific instance of the foregoing phenomenon of optimism bias.  
Recall the paradigms using the red and blue gratings in Wilburtz et al.’s (2014), pertaining to 
individual vs. individual selection. Supposed reporting red percepts is associated with a reward. As in 
the possum climbing example, a participant may infer that she is likely to be perceiving a red grating 
based not only on her inference that she is participating in a binocular rivalry task, but also based on 
a relatively high precision measure associated with the policy of reporting this grating, given that it is 
very conducive to her goal of receiving a monetary reward. She is thus slightly more likely to see the 
red rather than the blue grating.  
An analogous argument can be made for the effect of punished percepts. Suppose in this 
case that reporting a blue grating is associated with a small cost. As in the possum clambering case, a 
participant may infer that she is less likely to be perceiving a blue grating based not only on her 
inference that she is participating in a binocular rivalry task, but also based on the very low precision 
measure associated with the policy of perceiving this grating and her goal of receiving a reward. 
Rather, the best policy remains seeing a red percept, and the probability of the red percept will 
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remain slightly higher than seeing its blue counterpart. Consequently, she is more likely to 
perceptually infer rewarded percepts, as is suggested by the findings described in Section 5.1. And 
overall, the modified version can explain the role of reward in perceptual dominance in a way that 
Hohwy et al.’s (2008) epistemological account of binocular rivalry could not. 
 
 
5. Problem solved?  
We can set aside for now the discussion of whether we accept the modified solution to the role of 
reward in perceptual dominance or, indeed, if we accept the broader, modified version of the 
framework as applied to the problem of inferring policies. Let’s assume that the modified version of 
the approach has it right. What are we to make of this modified solution to the phenomenon of 
binocular rivalry? And more broadly, what are we to make of the modified approach to the 
underdetermination problem? 
The modified solution comes at the cost of abandoning a fully epistemic characterization of 
the underdetermination problem. Recall that on an epistemic approach to the problem, perceptual 
systems are thought to produce veridical representations of distal stimuli for the purposes of 
knowledge as well as action. Recall also that many proponents of hierarchical predictive coding are 
quite explicitly committed to this approach, suggesting that the function of perception is to “get the 
world right” (Hohwy 2013, p. 2) and capture “what’s going on out there” (Friston 2018, p. 1019).  
My analysis of the role of reward in binocular rivalry suggests that they can’t have it both 
ways. Hohwy et al.’s (2008) epistemological solution to binocular rivalry fails to account for the role 
of reward in perceptual dominance, and potential  appeals to precision struggle to get the job done. 
But the modified version of the view integrates perception and policies in such a way that perception 
can no longer be described as being only in the business of telling us about the world as it really is.  
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Instead, the modified version of the approach is profoundly pragmatic in nature. Not only 
does it not characterize perceptual systems as generating veridical representations of distal stimuli 
for the purposes of knowledge, it rejects the commitment to exclusive veridicality, and characterizes 
perceptual systems as generating biased representations of distal stimuli for the purposes of action.   
If this is right, however, then we are no longer in the business of understanding perception 
as consisting entirely of beliefs. Rather, we must recognize the importance of what folk 
psychological frameworks call desires and other approaches call reward (Sutton and Barto 2018). 
This is an interesting result and, in my view, by no means a disqualifying feature of the modified 
account. On the contrary, I take it to be a positive outcome of the preceding analysis. Nonetheless, 
if we want to accept the modified approach to binocular rivalry, we must also be prepared to take up 
this fuller picture and consider its implications for our understanding of perception.  
6. Conclusion 
Proponents of hierarchical predictive processing are committed to an epistemic approach to 
perception, according to which perceptual systems produce veridical representations of distal stimuli 
for the purposes of knowledge as well as action. However, I have argued that a prominent, 
epistemological version of this framework fails to account for the role of reward in binocular rivalry. 
I have further sought to show that a modified version of the general approach may be able to 
account for the role of reward in binocular rivalry, but that it is for its part fundamentally at odds 
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